POCSO Act: Supreme Court Says Presumption of Guilt Is Not Absolute

NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court has ruled that the statutory presumption of guilt under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act is not absolute and cannot be used as a substitute for reliable evidence, acquitting a man whose conviction was based on a prosecution case the court found riddled with contradictions and unsupported by medical and forensic evidence.

A bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria delivered the judgment on September 17, 2026, setting aside the Delhi High Court’s July 2025 decision that had upheld the man’s conviction under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The judgment in Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi, reported as 2026 INSC 1008, dealt with the operation of Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. The Supreme Court said those provisions create rebuttable presumptions and do not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to establish the case in accordance with criminal-law standards.

The case involved the alleged assault of a 2.5-year-old child

The case arose from an incident alleged to have taken place in Delhi on December 9, 2015. The prosecution case was that the appellant had taken his approximately 2.5-year-old neighbour to a park and sexually assaulted her.

The child’s mother lodged a complaint at Kalkaji police station on December 11, 2015. The trial court subsequently convicted the appellant and sentenced him to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, along with a separate one-year sentence under Section 363 of the IPC. The trial court acquitted him of a charge under Section 506 of the IPC.

The Delhi High Court confirmed the conviction in July 2025. It relied, among other things, on the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act and held that the burden had shifted to the accused to rebut it.

The Supreme Court took a different view after examining the evidence in detail.

Court found contradictions in the prosecution evidence

The Supreme Court focused heavily on inconsistencies between the testimony of the child’s mother and that of a private doctor whom she said she had consulted after the alleged incident.

The mother testified that she had taken the child to the doctor at about 9.30 p.m. The doctor, however, stated that the child had been brought to him at about 4 or 5 p.m. and that the mother was the only person accompanying her.

The court said the discrepancy was not a minor inconsistency when considered alongside the other evidence in the case. It also found material differences between the mother’s initial complaint and her later testimony in court.

The Supreme Court further examined the medical and forensic evidence.

The doctor who physically examined the child found no injury or bloodstains in the relevant area and reported that the hymen was intact without abnormality. The forensic evidence also did not detect semen or male DNA on the exhibits examined, and the forensic expert said blood could not be detected on the child’s clothing.

The court acknowledged that the absence of injury or semen does not by itself disprove a sexual assault. But it distinguished the present case because, in its assessment, the medical and forensic evidence collectively contradicted the prosecution’s particular allegation of penetrative assault.

Supreme Court explains limits of Section 29 presumption

A central part of the judgment concerned Section 29 of the POCSO Act.

The provision creates a statutory presumption in specified POCSO prosecutions, but the Supreme Court stressed that the presumption is not absolute. The prosecution must first establish the foundational facts necessary for the presumption to operate.

The court said a statutory presumption cannot mean that the prosecution’s version must automatically be accepted or that courts can stop scrutinising the evidence once the provision is invoked.

It held that the accused can attempt to rebut the presumption by exposing contradictions, gaps, improbabilities, inconsistencies between oral and medical evidence, or other weaknesses in the prosecution case.

The court also explained that Section 30, which concerns a presumption regarding culpable mental state, is similarly rebuttable.

Importantly, the Supreme Court maintained the distinction between the evidentiary burden placed on an accused and the prosecution’s ultimate burden. The accused is not required to establish innocence beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must still prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

‘Presumption of guilt would no longer remain effective’

The Supreme Court said that courts must continue to assess evidence using ordinary legal standards even where statutory presumptions apply.

It held that once serious evidentiary deficiencies emerge and the prosecution version loses credibility, the statutory presumption cannot by itself sustain a conviction. The court must consider the entire body of evidence, including material supporting the defence.

In the present case, the bench found that the prosecution evidence contained material contradictions and improbabilities, while the medical evidence did not support the allegation. The court concluded that the accused had successfully rebutted the prosecution case and that guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

The court also considered evidence concerning a dispute between the two families over a common water connection. It found that the existence of the dispute was established during cross-examination and said the defence version that the complaint had been motivated by that enmity gained credibility in light of the weaknesses in the prosecution evidence.

Conviction set aside, appellant acquitted

The Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court judgment as well as the trial court’s conviction and sentence under Section 363 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The appellant was held not guilty and acquitted of those offences. The court directed that he be released forthwith if he was in custody, unless his detention was required in connection with another offence.

The judgment does not dilute the statutory presumptions contained in the POCSO Act. Instead, it clarifies how they are to operate: they can shift the evidentiary burden after the prosecution establishes the necessary foundational facts, but they do not eliminate the court’s duty to examine the evidence or the prosecution’s ultimate burden to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The ruling therefore provides a detailed explanation of the relationship between POCSO’s reverse-burden provisions and the basic principles governing criminal trials, particularly where the evidence itself raises substantial doubts about the prosecution case.